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William Alexander Jardine (a.k.a. Alan) Watson is one of the
leading authorities on Roman law today. His specialty is the Republican period,1 but he has also earned the gratitude of the English-speaking world by editing a definitive translation of Justinian's Digest.'
For some time now, Professor Watson has taken an active interest
in comparative law, which, for him, is the study of borrowings and
transplants between legal systems that have some relationship to each
other.' "Borrowing," he argues, has been the "most fruitful source of
legal change" in the Western world.4 By examining a number of related systems over centuries, patterns of legal development can be
explained.5
t Hugh Lamar Stone Professor of Civil Law, The University of Texas. A.B.,
Syracuse; LL.B., LL.M., Duke; Dr. iur., Kiel.
I Professor Watson has written extensively on Roman law during the Republic.
See generally A. WATSON, LAW MAKING IN THE LATER ROMAN REPUBLIC (1974);
A. WATSON, THE LAW OF SUCCESSION IN THE LATER ROMAN REPUBLIC

(1971); A.

WATSON, THE LAW OF THE ANCIENT ROMANS (1970); A. WATSON, THE LAW OF
PERSONS IN THE LATER ROMAN REPUBLIC (1967); A. WATSON, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS IN THE LATER ROMAN REPUBLIC (1965).
2 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN (A. Watson ed. 1985).
' See generally A. WATSON, SOURCES OF LAW, LEGAL AMBIGUITY AND LEGAL
CHANGE (1985); A. WATSON, THE MAKING OF THE CIVIL LAW (1981); A. WATSON,
SOCIETY AND LEGAL CHANGE (1977); A. WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS, AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (1974) [hereinafter LEGAL TRANSPLANTS]; Watson,

Legal Change: Sources of Law and Legal Culture, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1121 (1983);
Watson, Comparative Law and Legal Change, 37 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 313 (1978); Watson, Legal Transplants and Law Reform, 92 LAW Q. REV. 79 (1976); see also A.
Watson, Failures of the Legal Imagination (forthcoming 1988).
' A. WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS, supra note 3, at 95; see also R. SCHLESINGER, H. BAADE, M. DAMASKA & P. HERZOG, COMPARATIVE LAW 309-10 (5th ed.

1988) [hereinafter COMPARATIVE LAW] (description of Professor Watson's views on
comparative law).
I According to Professor Watson, civil systems such as the Roman and the French
Civil Code frequently served as the best "quarry" for those outside the immediate European civil systems that seek to borrow law. See A. WATSON, THE EVOLUTION OF
THE LAW 118 (1985).
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Drawing on his superb knowledge of Roman law, Professor Watson has concentrated his comparative law studies on civil law systems,
defined by him as those that have accepted Justinian's Corpus Iuris
Civilis in whole or part.' There is, in his view, a definitive civil-law
tradition that has a vast importance in legal growth and that is usually
grossly underestimated. 7 His particular claim in this regard is profoundly pessimistic: "Legal rules are frequently and for long stretches
of time dysfunctional; ill-adapted to meet the needs and desires of the
society at large, its ruling elite or any recognizable group . . .,,
Roman Slave Law' does not follow the pattern established by the
author's previous studies. As a study of Roman law, it does not contain
a detailed analysis of all the sources, and it is not written for Roman
law specialists. Nor does it attempt to draw comparative insights from
the study of slavery law in a civil law context as, for instance, in Cuba
or in French or Spanish L(o)uisiana.'0 His interest was kindled by the
"different configuration of the law of slavery in the American South
and at Rome."" In a nutshell, and sharply put into comparative perspective by Judge A. Leon Higginbotham's insightful foreword, Roman
slavery was a misfortu.ne suffered irrespective of race, while slavery in
the American South was quintessentially racist. 2
As Professor Watson puts it, his book "is about the Dred Scott
case without his name being mentioned."'" Its primary descriptive summary of the Roman law of slavery from the Twelve Tables (circa 451
B.C.) to Justinian's Codification will serve, I am informed, as the point
of departure for later, comparative studies of slavery as a legal transplant in Latin America and the Caribbean and possibly-venturing
into areas yet unchartered by the author's published works-the common law states of the American South.
See A. WATSON, THE MAKING OF THE CIVIL LAW 4 (1981).
Professor Watson argues that while the Roman impact on civil law jurisdictions
is well known, "[w]hat has been consistently underestimated is the fact that the Roman
Law influence on the legal system as a whole . . . played the decisive role in the
features of these systems." LEGAL TRANSPLANTS, supra note 3, at 179.
8 See COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 4, at 309.
9 A. WATSON, ROMAN SLAVE LAW (1987).
10 Cf Baade, The Law of Slavery in Spanish Luisiana, 1769-1803, in LOUISIANA'S LEGAL HERITAGE 43, 45-53 (E. Haas ed. 1983) (discussion of slave law in
Cuba and in French and Spanish Louisiana).
A. WATSON, supra note 9, at xvii (1987).
12 Higginbotham, Foreword to A. WATSON, supra note 9, at x.
13 A. WATSON, supra note 9, at xvii; see Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19
How.) 393 (1857). For an analysis, see D. FEHRENBACHER,THE DRED SCOTT CASE,
ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS (1978). For further background,
8

see P.

(1981).
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Given this limited purpose, detailed review is out of place here.
Suffice it to say that in nine chapters ranging from enslavement to punishment,1 Professor Watson lucidly discusses the Roman law of slavery, while quoting extensively from the original sources in unaffected
English translation. A chronology, a glossary, and an index facilitate
ready orientation. There are, however, a few points of special interest
to more general readers.
First, on a fundamental level, Professor Watson emphasizes that
the Roman jurists considered slavery to be contrary to the laws of nature and therefore based on the general positive law of mankind (ius
gentium). Slavery was a misfortune Romans associated with capture by
the enemy and being "spared" death; hence possibly the derivation of
servus.15 Natural law thus did not, in Roman legal thinking, prevail
over positive law, and, remarkably, this thinking remained essentially
unchanged after Christianity became the state religion in the reign of
Emperor Constantine (306-37 A.D.). l
Enslavement appears to have occurred primarily by capture in the
period of Rome's expansion to a world empire and mainly by operation
of law (most importantly maternal descent) thereafter.' The ratio of
the slave population to the Roman population as a whole was very
high: thirty-five to forty per cent at the beginning of the first millennium.' Since Rome was not a police state and lacked an extensive bureaucracy, the Romans had to control this large slave population by a
careful mixture of penalties and rewards, ranging from automatic torture and death of all house slaves for failing to prevent the murder of
their master at home 9 to the expectation of negotiated freedom purchased with the slave's own savings after about six years' hard work.2"
Although Professor Watson fully develops the foundations of Ro14 The nine chapters of ROMAN SLAVE LAW are captioned as follows: Enslavement; Manumission and Citizenship; Freedmen, Patrons, and the State; The Slave as
Thing; The Slave as Man: Noncommercial Relations; The Slave as Man: Slave's Contracts and the Peculium; The Master's Acquisitions Through Slaves; Punishment of the
Slaves; and Senatus consultum Silanianum.
15 See A. WATSON, supra note 9, at 6.
In fact, during this period, not only did positive law prevail over natural law,
but the empire was unusually harsh in enforcing the difference between Roman citizens
and slaves. For example, slaves who informed on their masters were crucified. Id. at
83. Similarly, a woman caught having sex with her own slave was given the capital
sentence and the slave "delivered to the fire." Id. at 15.
17 See id. at 2, 8.
'8 See id.
19 The S.C. Silanianum dates from A.D. 10 and states that when a master is
murdered, all slaves under the same roof are subjected to torture and then condemned
to death. See id. at 134-38 (text of S.C. Silanianum).
20 See id. at 23.
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man slave law, he never definitively answers the question that he posed
at the outset: to what extent, and at what stages of its development, did
Roman law serve the slave owner efficiently, i.e., "maximizing the
profit (economic, social, and political) and. . . minimizing the risk (economic and physical)?"21 Essentially, the study is too brief, and too
remote from economic and demographic historical literature, to afford a
definitive answer. His closing chapter devoted to the chilling subject of
the S.C. Silanianum is effective dramatically, but might well have been
followed by a detailed summary. In particular, how does the author's
comparative law scheme apply to Roman law? Did Roman slave law,
as a cultural phenomenon, become "dysfunctional" and ill-adapted to
meet the needs of even the ruling elite during the eleven centuries of its
development? If so, or even more importantly, if not, how did Roman
law and legislation provide for flexibility and adaptation to changed
circumstances?
Secondly, the author might have given us a few more insights on
that most peculiar element of the "peculiar institution": the slave's
quasi-ownership of property, quite appropriately called peculium. This
is discussed, along with slaves' contracts, in a general context with the
reminder that, during the lifetime of the paterfamilias, even his adult
sons' property was technically peculium, thus subject to the father's
legal ownership. 2 Yet in real life, this factor might have been of limited significance, given an average male life expectancy of about
twenty-five years in urbanized Rome. The death of the paterfamilias
turned the sons' peculium into full ownership, while the slaves (unless
manumitted by or pursuant to testament, as was not uncommon)
merely acquired a new master with greater life expectancy.
Most importantly, it would have been fascinating to find out how
Roman law protected the slave's peculium against his own master, especially when it was to be used to purchase the freedom of the slave.
Professor Watson informs us that there appears to be no reported instance of the confiscation of a slave's peculium by his own master. Yet,
even in the late eighteenth century, slave owners in New Granada
(Venezuela) are reported to have attempted resorting to this device,
only to be foiled by the judicial recognition of an enforceable right of
self-purchase.2 3 According to conventional wisdom, unchallenged by
21

Id. at 1.

See id. at 46-47.
Meikeljohn, The Implementation of Slave Legislation in Eighteenth-Century
New Granada, in SLAVERY AND RACE RELATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA 176, 183-88
(1974).
22
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Professor Watson,2 4 this right was not recognized by Roman law. Perhaps this conventional wisdom needs critical examination.
Finally, there is the related but dogmatically distinct issue of the
master's acquisition of property through slaves, discussed in chapter
7.2 Today, we see the essence of agency in the power of A to conclude
a contract on the behalf of P with T in such a manner that only P and
T are parties to it.26 Yet, Roman law did not reach that level of refinement, focusing instead on the seemingly pedestrian question of the nature and consequences of the relationship between principal and
agent.27 The reason for this was slavery. Since the slave was merely the
instrument, not the representative, of his owner in commercial and
other proprietary transactions, he could operate, as a practical matter,
on his master's behalf as a commercial agent and effectuate property
transfers between his master and third parties.
Professor Watson notes, however, that the use of slaves as de facto
agents in commercial transactions "cannot be a full explanation" for
the failure of Roman law to develop the legal concept of direct
agency.2 Given his expertise on this subject, 29 one might hope that he
will return to it at greater length soon.
In conclusion, all those who take an interest in the legal history of
slavery would benefit from a close and repeated reading of Alan Watson's Roman Slave Law. There is much to be learned from him now,
but there will be even more (so we hope confidently) when he presents
us with his eagerly awaited study of Roman slave law as a "legal transplant" in the New World.

See A.

WATSON, supra note 9, at 43.
See id. at 102-114.
See id. at 104-107 (explaining how notions of mancipatio and delivery of res
nec mancipi made slaves in commerce more valuable than a free person).
27 See id. at 90, 107-08.
28 Id. at 108.
29 See, e.g., A. WATSON, CONTRACT OF MANDATE IN ROMAN LAW (1961).
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